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Legal Framework of Privatization in Russia
Georgi G. Angelov*
The current power struggle between the Congress of Peo-
ple's Deputies and President Boris Yeltsin raises the dynamic
question of the future of democracy and economic reform in
Russia. In theory, the conflict between the Congress and the
President is centered on a fundamental constitutional issue, the
division of powers between the legislative and executive
branches of government. In fact, the real issue is the struggle
for survival between a communist-elected Congress that draws
its powers from a Brezhnev-era Constitution, and a democrati-
cally elected President that represents the fledgling parties and
movements in Russia committed to reform and conversion to a
market-oriented economy.
This Article focuses on one of the most important elements
of economic reform in Russia - the legal framework of priva-
tization. It examines the ability of the legal structures to sup-
port the economic reform, the prospects for foreign investors
and, when appropriate, compares the experience of Russia with
the approach adopted by the Eastern European countries. Addi-
tionally, this Article provides a brief analysis of the similarities
and differences between the Russian and Moscow privatization
plans.
I. OVERVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA
The basis for privatization and marketization in the Russian
economy was set forth in the Program for Deepening the Eco-
nomic Reform in the Russian Federation (Program) adopted on
July 17, 1992.1 The Program is a comprehensive 280 page docu-
ment that discusses the general goals of the reform - liberaliza-
tion and stabilization, institutional changes, structural policy,
foreign investment, social policy and expected results.
* Foreign Law Consultant, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C.
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1. ROSIISKAYA GAZETA, July 17, 1992, at 1.
MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
According to the Program, reforms will deregulate the
economy, stabilize the financial and monetary system, privatize
state-owned property, develop entrepreneurship, make struc-
tural adjustments to and demilitarize the economy, and create a
competitive market environment and an active social policy.
The Program demonstrated impressive results within six
months after its implementation. According to Russian sources,
as of January 1, 1993, approximately 46,000 enterprises of an es-
timated 226,657 enterprises have become. private, and the budget
profit received from privatization amounted to 164 billion rubles
(R).2 This is almost a three-fold increase since September 1992.3
These results prove that the program is gaining momentum. So
far, the Yeltsin government has been successful in laying the
foundations for the basic legal framework necessary to imple-
ment the Program. Considerable efforts, however, will be
needed to maintain the momentum necessary to ensure steady,
and complete privatization throughout Russia.
II. GENERAL LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Russian legal system still carries the same basic struc-
ture as the former USSR: a hierarchy of the Constitution, a
body of basic law known as the Fundamentals of Civil Legisla-
tion, laws, ordinances, and normative acts or regulations. With
the creation of a new Russian state and the introduction of a
market-oriented economy, however, changes have occurred at
all levels of this system.
Unlike some of the newly independent states, the Russian
Federation has not yet adopted its own Constitution. The old
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Constitution
is still valid in Russia, although with numerous amendments.
The most recent amendment was adopted on April 21, 1992.4
The adoption of a new draft Constitution, designed to break with
the communist past and provide the legal basis for the develop-
2. Chubais Discusses "People's Privatization" at ConAference, F.B.I.S., Feb.
23, 1993, at 23.
3. See 72% of Russia's Enterprises Privatized, F.B.I.S., Sept. 18, 1992, at
21.
4. Law No. 2708-1 of the Russian Federation on Amending and Supple-
menting the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, May 16, 1992, at 3. The amendments
introduced inter alia the new name of the republic: Russian Federation or Rus-
sia. The RSFSR Constitution was adopted in 1978 and, as well as the Constitu-
tions of the other republics, was molded along the lines of the 1977 USSR
"Brezhnev" Constitution.
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ment of a democratic state and free market economy, is at the
center of the current political debate in Russia.5
The Fundamentals of Civil Legislation (Fundamentals),
which define the objectives of civil law and contain the basic pro-
visions of the most important institutions of civil law, occupy an
intermediate status between the Constitution and ordinary laws.
Under the old Soviet system, the Fundamentals contained civil
law provisions which every republic had to incorporate into its
civil code.6 These basic principles were then further developed
by the civil codes of the union republics. The last Soviet Funda-
mentals were adopted in 1981. In 1991, the Gorbachev govern-
ment adopted new Fundamentals, which were to become
effective on January 1, 1992. Before the new Fundamentals took
effect, however, the Soviet Union was dismantled. Taking a
pragmatic approach, the Russian Parliament did provide that
the 1991 USSR Fundamentals would apply until the adoption of
a new Russian Civil Code, except for provisions that spell out
the powers of the old USSR in civil legislation, or that contradict
the Russian Federation Constitution or legislative acts adopted
after the sovereignty of the Russian Federation was declared on
June 12, 1990.7 In general, the new Fundamentals are quite lib-
eral and market-oriented. Their most important achievement is
the abolishment of the supremacy of state property." The new
Code, which is currently being drafted by the Research Center
for Civil Law, is expected to be enacted by January 1, 1994. 9
III. NEW ECONOMIC AND PRIVATIZATION
LEGISLATION
In a nutshell, the privatization plan will proceed as follows:
First, large state and municipal enterprises are converted into
5. Draft Constitution Submitted, ROSSIISKAYA GAzETA, Mar. 3, 1992, at 1.
The analysis of the Constitutional Referendum problem falls beyond the scope
of this article.
6. Russian Federation Reaches Back to 1991 USSR Fundamentals of Civil
Law, 3 SuRv. E. EuR. L. 5, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 5.
7. Decree No. 3301-1 of July 14, 1992, "On the Regulation of Civil Legal
Relations in the Period of Carrying out Economic Reforms," ROSSIISKAYA
GAZETA, July 24, 1992, at 2.
8. For a discussion of the 1991 Fundamentals see Overview of the 1991
Fundamentals, 2 SURV. E. EUR. L. 6, Aug. 1991, at 4.
9. Interview with Mikhail Mitiukov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
Committee on Legislation, on the Draft Civil Code, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, July
24, 1992, at 4. The draft Code draws heavily on the experience of other civil law
countries, especially the Netherlands, which recently adopted amendments tak-
ing into account the EEC experience.
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joint stock companies. 10 The purpose of this conversion, also
known as "denationalization" or "corporatization," is to transfer
ownership of the assets of each enterprise from the State to the
newly organized companies. The State obtains at least forty-
nine percent of the shares, and exercises control by acting
through a specially appointed Committee.
Next, all or some of the total shares in these new joint stock
companies are sold to private investors who can trade them
freely, thus creating a market for securities.
Finally, personal privatization vouchers are issued to allow
private Russian citizens to buy shares." These citizens are en-
couraged to participate in the reform, thus creating middle-class
owners actively involved in restructuring the economy.
A series of new laws, regulations and programs, discussed
below, details the elements of this simple structure.
A. LAW ON PRIVATIZATION
The Russian Law on Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises (RLP) was adopted on July 3, 1991, and amended on
June 5, 1992.12 It establishes the structure for denationalization
of state-owned enterprises, the first stage of the privatization
process. According to RLP article 1, "privatization" means the
acquisition by citizens and joint stock companies of enterprises,
shares in enterprises, and tangible and intangible assets from
the state and local soviets. The privatization of land is specifi-
cally excluded. 13
RLP article 3 provides for a three-year privatization pro-
gram. The program, which was developed by the Government
and ratified by the Supreme Soviet, lists the enterprises to be
10. The same procedure has been used in all Eastern and Central European
countries that have adopted privatization programs, and in Germany, Britain
and Italy in the reorganization of state concerns. See generally WALTER
JERMAKOWICZ, PRIVATIZATION IN POLAND: AImS AND METHODS, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL FOUNDATION FOR CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND OWNERSHIP
CHANGES IN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND-CENTER FOR PRIVATIZATION.
11. The terms privatization "check" and privatization "voucher" are used
interchangeably throughout this article.
12. RLP, DELOVOI MIR, July 21, 1992, at 6.
13. With respect to the privatization of land, President Yeltsin signed De-
cree No. 631 of July 14, 1992, "On Confirming the Procedure for the Sale of
Land Tracts During Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises, for Ex-
tension of and Additional Construction by These Enterprises, and Also on Land
Tracts Offered to Citizens and Associations of Citizens for Entrepreneurial Ac-
tivity," ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, June 18, 1992, at 4. For a discussion of the provi-
sions of this Decree with regard to foreign investors see infra Part III.I.
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privatized during the first year and proposes enterprises to be
privatized during the two subsequent years. 14 The 1992 Program
contains a list of five types of enterprises: 1) enterprises which
cannot be privatized, such as the Central Bank, certain enter-
prises in the defense industry, and objects with cultural and his-
torical value; 2) enterprises which can be privatized only with
the approval of the government of the Russian Federation or the
governments of the republics included in the Russian Federa-
tion, such as utilities, commercial banks and telecommunica-
tions; 3) large enterprises, important to the economy, which can
be privatized only by decision of the Committee on Property in
conjunction with the relevant branch ministry, such as mari-
time, railway, aviation and river transport enterprises; 4) enter-
prises which can be privatized only through local privatization
programs, such as public transport and small municipal enter-
prises; and 5) enterprises which must be privatized because they
are crucial to the development and functioning of a free market,
such as those involved in commerce and trade, construction, food
processing and light industry.15
In addition, in accordance with RLP article 3(3), Decree No.
1392 allows the Government or the State Committee on the Ad-
14. Similar Programs have been adopted by some Eastern European coun-
tries. In Bulgaria, privatization is carried out according to an Annual Program
developed by the Privatization Agency and approved by the Council of Minis-
ters. Article 2 of the Bulgarian Law on Conversion and Privatization of State
and Municipal Enterprises, STATE GAZETTE 38, May 8, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter
BLP], English text and commentaries published in 1 BULGARIAN LEG. DEV. 3,
Aug., 1992. In Poland, the Sejm, the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament,
adopts Annual Privatization Directives. Article 2(1) Law on Privatization of
State Owned Enterprises of July 13, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1226 (1990) [hereinafter
PLP]. In Hungary, a whole network of privatization programs has been intro-
duced by different laws such as Law XIII on the Conversion of Economic Orga-
nizations and Business Associations (May 30, 1989) as amended by Law LXXII
of 1990, and Law LXXIV on the Privatization of State-owned Companies En-
gaged in Retail Trade, Catering and Consumer Services (Sept. 18, 1990), Hun-
garian Rules of Law in Force, No. 25, at 1573 and 1610. In Czechoslovakia
(author's note: throughout the text reference is made to Czechoslovakia be-
cause the laws and regulations discussed were adopted before the division of the
country into the Czech and Slovak Republics) the initiative is left to individual
enterprises, which must submit their own privatization projects for approval by
the Federal Ministry of Finance or competent state administration agency. Act
on the Conditions of Transfer of State Property to Other Persons ("Large-Scale"
Privatization Law) of February 26, 1991, (CSLP), No. 92/1991 Collection of
Laws, CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATTERS 2, Parker School, Co-
lumbia University.
15. For the complete list see Point 2, State Program on Privatization of
State and Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation for 1992 (RPP),
KOMMERSANT, July 8-15, 1992, at 20.
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ministration of State Property (GKI) to elect to keep as federal
property for a period of three years a controlling share of stocks
of certain enterprises which are important to the Russian econ-
omy.'6 Thus, article 3(3) and Decree No. 1392 effectively intro-
duce the concept of "Golden Share," providing veto power to the
listed authorities over certain key issues relating to the manage-
ment and activity of a joint-stock company.17
The preparation of the 1993 Draft Program on Privatiza-
tion,'8 which draws from the experience and results of the 1992
Program, has been surrounded by a great deal of controversy
and has not yet been adopted. According to Anatoliy Chubais,
the Russian Deputy Prime Minister and President of the GKI,
the 1993 Program was withdrawn in order to give more rights to
the regions within the Russian Federation, in accordance with
the Federation Treaty.19 Privatization in 1993, therefore, will
continue according to the provisions of the legal regime cur-
rently in place.
B. PRIVATIZATION AGENCIES
Russia has adopted a two-tier system of state agencies to
regulate the privatization process.20 The GKI is responsible for
planning and controlling the privatization process. The GKI
drafts the privatization program that is submitted to the govern-
ment and ratified by the Supreme Soviet, and sets up local, re-
gional and district committees in charge of planning
16. Decree No. 1392 on Measures for Realization of Industrial Policy Dur-
ing Privatization of State Enterprises, ECONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA No. 48, Nov.
1992, at 18.
17. For example, the controlling block of shares of telecommunications en-
terprises during their conversion into joint-stock companies shall remain under
federal ownership for a period of three years. Decree No. 1003, art. 1, of Dec. 22,
1992, Decree on Privatization of Communications Enterprises, F.B.I.S., Jan.
15, 1993, at 31.
18. F.B.I.S., Feb. 24, 1993, at 62.
19. Chubais on Refinements to Privatization Program, F.B.I.S., Feb. 25,
1993, at 33. It seems more realistic, however, to interpret the withdrawal of the
1993 Program by President Yeltsin as a maneuver to avoid a premature con-
frontation with Congress.
20. In Bulgaria, the Privatization Agency (PA) is the authority charged
with organizing and controlling the privatization process. BLP, supra note 14,
art. 10. Depending on the book value of the fixed assets of a company, the
Council of Ministers, or another ministry which has jurisdiction, may need to
authorize the privatization process. Id. art. 3. In Poland the Minister of Owner-
ship Transformation (MOT) is in charge of the privatization process, and the
State Treasury plp performs the role of the Property Fund. PLP, Supra note
14, arts. 1, 6. In Hungary, Parliament controls the State Property Agency
(SPA) and the State Office of Accountability supervises the SPA.
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privatization within their jurisdiction.21
The actual sale of privatized enterprises is conducted
through an executive body, which at the Federation level is the
Russian Fund of Federal Property. Similar Funds have been es-
tablished in the regions, districts and cities. The Fund is a gov-
ernment entity and is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the
Russian Federation. The Fund also acts as the state's sole stock-
holder of the newly converted companies. In order to prevent
unnecessary interference in the day-to-day management of a
company, however, only twenty percent of the shares of an en-
terprise held by the Fund are voting, while the rest are con-
verted into non-voting shares. Upon their sale, non-voting
shares are converted back into voting shares. 22
C. PRIVATIZATION PROCEDURE
For the purpose of privatization, the 1992 Program divides
all enterprises into three categories:
1. Small enterprises with .up to 200 workers and. assets of
less than one million rubles. Shares in these enterprises will be
sold at auctions as whole entities, without prior conversion to
joint-stock companies;
2. Enterprises with more than 1000 workers and assets ex-
ceeding fifty million rubles. These must be converted to open
joint-stock companies as the first step in privatization;23 and
3. All other enterprises can be privatized using either of
the above procedures.
The process of privatizing a state or municipal enterprise
may be started by almost anyone, including its employees, the
management, and potential buyers. This last category may in-
clude foreign legal persons, bankers, creditors, or local or state
property committees.24 A petition to start the process must be
21. RLP, supra note 12, arts. 4, 5.
22. Id. art. 6(3).
23. Special rules for the conversion of such enterprises are provided for in
Decree No. 721 and in the Statute on Commercialization. See infra text accom-
panying notes 29-30.
24. RLP, supra note 12, art. 13. This willingness to consider proposals from
almost any reasonable source is typical of privatization laws. In Bulgaria, the
initiative may come from the management, employees, the PA or ministry hav-
ing jurisdiction. BLP, supra note 14, art. 4. In Poland the initiative may come
from the bottom (from the employees or the director), or from the top - from
the competent Minister. PLP, supra note 14, arts. 5, 6. In Czechoslovakia, a
"privatization project" can be put forward by practically anybody such as minis-
try, municipality, M.P., or enterprise. CSLP, supra note 14, art. 7. In Hungary,
the initiation may come from the plan of the SPA, by the company or by an
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registered with the appropriate Property Committee, or local
GKI. The purpose of this procedure is simply to ensure that the
enterprise is not excluded from privatization by the Privatiza-
tion Program, and that the prospective buyer satisfies the re-
quirements of RLP article 9.2 The decision, which must be
adopted within two weeks, becomes legally binding.2 6
Once the petition to privatize an enterprise is approved, a
privatization board is established for the enterprise. This board
is a sub-committee of the local committee of the GKI, and its
president is appointed by the local GKI. Within a specified dead-
line, the board must prepare a detailed privatization plan which
must specify the methods and deadline for privatization, the ini-
tial value of the enterprise, and the amount of the statutory capi-
tal. The plan must be subsequently coordinated with the local
Council of People's Deputies and approved by the appropriate
Property Committee. If the Council of People's Deputies disap-
proves the plan, the board must devise a new one. If there is
further disagreement, the Property Committee makes the final
decision.27 Once the plan is approved, the enterprise is included
in the schedule for sales, tenders and auctions.2s
For enterprises subject to conversion into joint-stock com-
panies, the Decree on conversion of state enterprises and the ac-
companying Statute on Commercialization, 29 adopted less than
one month after the amendment of the RLP, provide for a
slightly different procedure and time frame. According to the
statute, enterprises subject to conversion must establish priva-
outside entity, for example takeover proceedings initiated by foreign or domes-
tic investors.
25. For an explanation of the requirements of RLP art. 9 see infra text
accompanying notes 46-47; RLP, supra note 12, art. 14.
26. Id, at art. 5(3); see also Decree No. 66 "On Speeding up of the Privatiza-
tion of State and Municipal Enterprises," of January 29, 1992, RosSIISKAYA
GAZETA, Feb. 20, 1992, at 3.
27. The Law does not yet provide for guidelines in the case where the
Property Committee disagrees with the plan.
28. RLP, supra note 12, art. 14. Obviously this procedure is somewhat
rough and complicated. Changes are expected after the GKI gains more experi-
ence. The process is further burdened by the fact that Property Committees
are specifically denied the opportunity to delegate power to other bodies with
more than 25% state participation. In Bulgaria, in order to speed up the pro-
cess, such authority is divided between the Privatization Agency, five ministries
and local municipal councils. BLP, supra note 14, art. 3.
29. Decree No. 721 "On Organizational Measures for the Conversion of
State Enterprises, Voluntary Associations of State Enterprises into Stock Com-
panies," of July 1, 1992, and the attached Statute on Commercialization of State
Enterprises with Simultaneous Transformation into Open Stock Companies of
July 1, 1992, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, July 7, 1992, at 4.
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tization boards.3° Initially, the board was required to prepare
the privatization documents such as the privatization plan, ap-
praisal and Charter no later than October 1, 1992. For privatiza-
tions after that date, the statute requires the local GKI board to
prepare the documents. Once the documents are submitted, the
GKI has seven days to study them and an additional seven days
to make changes. When approved by the Property Committee,
the plan becomes a decision for conversion, and becomes legally
binding.31 Although the October deadline was not realistic and
was not met in many cases, this Decree provides further evi-
dence of the Yeltsin government's interest in proceeding with
privatization at a rapid pace.
D. METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION
The RLP defines four methods of privatization: an open
auction, a closed auction or tender, a tender with conditions, and
a buyout of leased property. The 1992 Privatization Program
and the Statute on the Sale of Shares in the Process of Privatiza-
tion,3 2 detail and expand these procedures and include as vari-
ants "commercial tenders" and "investment auctions. ' 33 With
the exception of small enterprises, all enterprises may be priva-
tized using any of the privatization methods.
Small enterprises and the assets of liquidated enterprises
are sold at an open auction. This is a simple procedure; the win-
30. Statute on Commercialization, supra note 29, Point 3.
31. Id Points 4, 6.
32. ECONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA No. 47, Nov. 1992, at 11. In order to guar-
antee a market for privatization checks, the Statute on Specialized Check Auc-
tions, in conjunction with the Statute on the Sale of Shares, provide that 80% of
the shares of state enterprises, and 35-90% of the shares of municipal enter-
prises (with the exception of those sold at closed subscription) will be sold to
the public only in return for privatization checks. KOMMERSANT, Nov. 16-22,
1992, at 19.
Decree No. 1705 on "Broadening the Possibilities for Participation of the
Population in Specialized Check Auctions introduces two amendments. First, it
provides for a possibility of increasing the number of shares for sale by their
division into smaller denominations. Second, it allows 5% of the total number
of shares to be sold for cash in order to cover the expenses of organizing the
auction. KOMMERSANT, Jan. 4-10, 1993, at 12.
33. Bulgaria provides for open sales, auctions of blocks of shares, public
tenders, and negotiations with potential buyers. BLP, supra note 14, art. 25.
Under Polish privatization, shares may be sold at auctions, through public offer-
ing or through negotiations. PLP, supra note 14, art. 23. CSLP, supra note 14,
article 14 provides only for auctions. In Hungary, the favored methods are pub-
lic offering, closed bids and private auctions.
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ner of the auction is the person bidding the highest price.34
Stock in large enterprises may be sold at closed auctions or
tenders, with a procedure similar to that used to sell treasury
bonds. Interested bidders mail bids for specified amounts of
stock to the tender commission; the winners are those offering
the highest price.35
Tenders with conditions are used when the buyer of an en-
terprise must comply with certain conditions defined by the
State or local Committee on Property. Such conditions are sup-
posed to be limited to requirements to maintain the same line of
production, to keep a certain number of employees, to invest a
given level over a specified period of time, and to maintain cer-
tain social programs. The imposition of additional requirements
is prohibited.36 This method of privatization is used with various
enterprises that are either very important to a region's economy,
national security or social welfare. The winner of the tender is
the participant who satisfies all of the requirements and offers
the best price.37
A buyout of leased property allows the employees of an en-
terprise to sign a lease contract with a provision for buyout upon
the expiration of the contract. The lease contract might have
been signed either before or after the adoption of the RLP.3 In
either case, the employees are allowed to purchase the leased
property according to the buyout terms of the lease contract, the
general rules defined in RLP articles 15, 20, 21 and 24, and the
provisions of the regulations adopted by the President and the
GKI.39
Investment auctions are organized when the buyer has to
comply with an investment program to develop the business.
These are merely a variant of a tender with conditions; the win-
ner is the bidder whose proposal best meets the criteria of the
investment program, not necessarily the one who offers the
highest price.40 This method may be attractive to investors be-
cause most of the offered capital will be injected directly into the
34. Decree No. 66, supra note 26, app. 4, Temporary Provision on the Priva-
tization of State and Municipal Enterprises on Auctions, art. 4(1) and 4(2).
35. Id app. 4, art. 4(3).
36. Id app. 5, art. 2(8).
37. RLP, supra note 12, art. 20; Decree No. 66, supra note 26, art. 2(9).
38. RLP, supra note 12, art. 15.
39. Decree No. 1230 "On Regulation of Lease Relations and Privatization
of Property Leased by State and Municipal Enterprises," ROSSIISKIE VESTI, No.
98, Nov. 1992, at 1, and Instruction on Privatization of Property Leased by State
and Municipal Enterprises, KOMMERSANT No. 6, Feb. 8-14, 1993, at 25.
40. RPP, supra note 15, point 5.6.2.
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business for the agreed upon investment programs rather than
going to the state. In effect, the state sells the enterprise, at a
reduced price, to a bidder willing and able to invest enough to
develop it.
Finally, commercial tenders with a limited number of par-
ticipants may be used for enterprises in rural areas, small vil-
lages, and in the Far North. The participants in such
competitions may be limited to the employees of the enterprise,
local citizens, or individuals who were deported from the region
during the period of mass repression. Commercial tenders are
limited to commercial companies, restaurants, and companies
engaged in food processing or farm equipment production. 41
E. APPRAISAL OF ENTERPRISES
An essential part of preparing an enterprise for sale is con-
ducting an inventory and making a comprehensive financial ap-
praisal. This is one of the most difficult problems because of the
absence of Western style accounting principles and the lack of
people in Russia with the necessary ttaining.42
According to RLP article 17, appraisals must follow method-
ological instructions developed by the Committee on Property,
details of which are spelled out in the "Temporary Methodologi-
cal Instructions on the Appraisal of the Value of Objects Subject
to Privatization" (Instructions). 43
In general, valuations are based on asset appraisals. Fixed
assets and other tangibles are valued at book value, usually at
depreciated historical cost. The current inflation of the ruble,
however, may render such valuations completely meaningless,
and some sort of valuation at current costs, which appears to be
an allowed method, will probably be used.44 A similar treatment
of intangible assets, which the Instructions also require to be
valued at depreciated historical cost, seems likely.
Although the Instructions seem to be comprehensive, there
is little experience in applying them, and it is not clear whether
they will prove workable in practice. For an investor, valuation
based on book value is likely to be meaningless because in most
41. Id. point 5.6.1.
42. The same problem exists in all Eastern European countries. For prag-
matic reasons, all of them allow and encourage the participation of foreign ex-
perts. In Russia, the foreign advisory team on privatization is led by Deloitte &
Touche.
43. Decree No. 66, supra note 26, app. 2.
44. RLP, supra note 12, art. 3(1)(1).
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cases it will reflect the value of old and dilapidated machinery
and equipment; thus it does not reflect true earnings potential.
From an investor's point of view, therefore, it might be more
useful to use a valuation based on current cash flow or income.
The reader should note that the government has com-
menced a special program for the adoption of international ac-
counting standards, and the draft of a Law on Accounting has
been submitted to the Supreme Council. 45
F. BUYERS
The RLP adopts a very liberal approach to defining poten-
tial buyers. According to article 9, only legal entities with more
than twenty-five percent state ownership are barred from buy-
ing state-owned enterprises.46 The purpose of this restriction is
to prevent the transfer of property from one state or municipal
enterprise to another, thus circumventing the purpose of the
privatization process. The burden of proof lies with the buyer.
This limitation will apply to some existing joint ventures in
which the Russian partner is a state company.
The RLP, however, favors employee-led bids for their own
enterprises. A special provision allows employees who wish to
participate more actively in privatization to register a special
company for this purpose. If such a company represents at least
one-third of the employees of an enterprise to be privatized, par-
ticipates in the privatization auction or tender, and can offer
terms equal to those of other bidders, it is given priority. In ad-
dition, the special company will have the right to pay in install-
ments over three years. The first payment, however, may not be
less than twenty-five percent of the price. 47
G. PRIVATIZATION VOUCHERS
Because the purpose of converting state and municipal en-
terprises into stock companies is to make possible the sale of
shares to private citizens or organizations, the question of how to
distribute such shares has created much debate throughout East-
45. Decree No. 121 "On Measures for the Realization of the State Program
for Adoption by the Russian Federation of International Accounting and Statis-
tics Systems in Accordance with the Requirements of Market Economy," Rossi-
ISKAYA GAZETA, Feb. 18,1993, at 6, and Draft Law on Accounting Activity in the
Russian Federation, ECONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA No. 50, Dec. 1992, at 5.
46. In Bulgaria, the limit for state or municipal participation is 50%. BLP,
supra note 14, art. 5(4).
47. RLP, supra note 12, arts. 23, 24.
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em Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). The debate revolves primarily around the issue of
voucher distribution. Fundamentally, two different approaches
are available:
First, employees of an enterprise that will be privatized may
be allowed to buy a percentage of the shares on preferential
terms. Bulgaria and Hungary have both adopted this method.
Second, all citizens may be issued privatization "vouchers"
or certificates of a similar value which may be used to buy
shares. This approach was adopted in the CSFR and Poland,4s
and was recently chosen by Russia. In addition, employees in
Russia will be allowed to buy a percentage of the shares of their
own enterprises on preferential terms.
The voucher approach has some significant advantages: it
will give each citizen an equal start, and it will involve millions
of people in the privatization process, thus encouraging the de-
velopment of a large middle class. It also compensates to some
extent for the lack of savings by the population. But the
voucher approach also has major drawbacks: it simply replaces
the anonymity of the state as the ultimate owner with the ano-
nymity of thousands of unknown individuals who will have little
or no say in the management or control of a company. Finan-
cially, it is accompanied by considerable expense and bureau-
cracy, and as witnessed in Czechoslovakia, may become the
source of potential fraud.49 In Hungary, "privatization coupons"
or "indemnification vouchers" are issued only to compensate
former owners of land taken by the state. Such vouchers can be
used to buy shares in privatized companies, to buy farm land, or
to cover housing costs.
Given the historical background of Russia, the mass coer-
48. In Poland the decision to issue vouchers rests with the Sejm, which is
currently considering a draft law. PLP, supra note 14, art. 25. The concept,
however, is that even if vouchers are issued they may be used only for invest-
ment in Mutual Funds.
49. In Czechoslovakia an unknown emigre offered citizens a guaranteed
ten-fold return on vouchers in a year's time if they let him manage them. As a
result, the government was faced with the prospect of one individual control-
ling considerable amounts of the nation's industry, with the possibility of subse-
quently reselling the shares to foreign interests. See infra note 61 for a
discussion of the solution to this problem.
50. Law No. XXV On Settling Ownership Conditions, on the Partial In-
demnification of Damages Caused by the State on Property of Citizens, adopted
on June 26, 1991, and Law XXIV On Settling Ownership Conditions, on Provid-
ing Partial Compensation for Unjust Damages Inflicted by the State on the
Property of Citizens as a Result of Enforcing Legal Provisions Adopted Be-
tween May 1, 1939 and June 8, 1949 (on file with author). Interview with Laslo
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cive collectivization following the October Revolution, the force-
fully propagated ideas of equality among citizens and strong
communist. opposition, it is not surprising that Russia has
adopted the relatively egalitarian Czechoslovak model of priva-
tization.51 Of course, all parallels should be drawn very care-
fully in yew of Russia's larger economy and population.52
In his address to the nation on the anniversary of the failed
coup of August 1991, President Yeltsin announced that every cit-
izen of Russia would be given a privatization check.53 The de-
tails were spelled out in*Decree No. 914 and its Supplement.54
According to these legislative acts, checks are issued in bearer
form, with a value of 10,000 R.5 5 The checks are valid for one
year and there is a 25 R fee for their issuance. They can be used
to buy shares, invest in mutual funds (to be established later), or
sold for cash.56
Those who so elect may buy shares in any company whose
shares are available, but special advantages are available to em-
ployees who wish to buy shares in their own company. These
preferential terms, intended to curtail worker's opposition to
privatization, are spelled out in the 1992 Privatization Program
Takacs, Consul, Embassy of the Republic of Hungary, in Washington, D.C.
(Sept. 18, 1992).
51. It is interesting to note, however, that the debate over voucher distribu-
tion is not yet closed even in a country like Hungary, which is furthest along in
the privatization process. There is an ongoing debate about the distribution of
free vouchers to every citizen in order to create a middle class, ease economic
tensions and accelerate the privatization process. Kupa's New Privatization
Program Discussed, F.B.I.S., Feb. 22, 1993, at 16. In Bulgaria the issue of
voucher distribution has also been raised, but the broad restitution programs
adopted by the government appear to have neutralized this problem.
52. Given this history and the 60-70 years that have passed since property
was nationalized and farms collectivized, it is understandable that the restitu-
tion of property to former owners, which has been quite widespread and suc-
cessful in Eastern Europe, has not been raised as an issue in Russia.
53. Yeltsin Addresses Nation, F.B.I.S., Aug. 20, 1992, at 17.
54. Decree No. 914 of the Russian President "On Introducing a System of
Privatization Checks in the Russian Federation" of August 14, 1992, and Supple-
ment to Russian President's Decree No. 914 of August 14. Statute on Privatiza-
tion Checks. English translation published in F.B.I.S., Aug. 26, 1992, at 19-20.
55. Approximately $15. Compare this with the Czechoslovak "investment
coupons," which are untransferable and have a value of 30,000 korunas (about
$1,000). CSLP, supra note 14, art. 22. The nominal price for acquisition of
Czechoslovak coupons is 1,035 korunas or about $35.
56. In view of current economic hardships, this may prove to be a very
strong temptation for many citizens and a source of profit for some of the new
entrepreneurs. The chances for fraud of various sorts are quite real. In the
Russian press there are already reports of individuals compiling lists of retired
citizens and students most likely to be willing to sell their shares for quick cash.
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and the Statute on Close Subscription to Shares.57
Employees of an enterprise may choose between three pos-
sibilities or "options"- as they are called in the Program. The
main differences between the three options include the level of
employee participation, the amount of discount on the share
price, the level of control retained by the employees over the
privatized company, and the potential for foreign investment.5s
The underlying principle is that the more control the employees
retain over the privatized enterprise, the less the discount they
are given. As a general rule, the monetary amount of discounts
and preferential terms offered to employees in Russia, as well as
in Eastern Europe, is limited. The discount amount is further
eroded by the low salaries, limited savings and galloping infla-
tion. Therefore, the key roles in privatization will probably be
played by Mutual Funds and large foreign corporate investors.
In the first employee option, preferred shares amounting to
the lesser of 25% of the total capital or 7,000 R per person, would
be distributed free of charge to the employees. In addition, vot-
ing shares amounting to 10% of the capital (but not more than
2,000 R per person) could be sold at a 30% discount. Members of
management could buy an additional 5% of the voting shares.
This option allows employees and management to make full use
of the free and discount distribution of shares, but limits the
control they could exercise. This option may be adopted by sim-
ple recommendation on the part of the employees.
The second option allows employees, through closed sub-
scription, to buy shares representing up to 51% of the capital at
market prices. This option allows the employees, by obtaining
51% of the capital, to control the privatized company, but it re-
quires them to pay for this right at market prices. This option
can only be adopted by a two-thirds vote at a general meeting of
all employees.
The third option allows a group of employees to sign a man-
agement contract for one year, with the obligation to fulfill the
privatization plan of an enterprise and to avoid bankruptcy. At
the expiration of the contract, if all the conditions are fulfilled,
the members of the group have the right to acquire 20% of the
enterprise's voting shares at market prices. In addition, all em-
ployees have the option to buy 20% of all voting shares at a 30%
discount, provided that the total value of shares does not exceed
57. Statute on Close Subscription to Shares at the Privatization of State
and Municipal Enterprises, KommEsANT, July 27-Aug. 3, 1992, at 21.
58. For a discussion of foreign investors options, see irfra Part III.I.
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7,000 R per person. This third option is limited to enterprises in
the middle range - those with a capital between one and fifty
million rubles and more than 200 employees. As with the sec-
ond option, adoption of the third option requires a two-thirds
vote at a general meeting of all employees.59
It is important for foreign investors to be familiar with the
three options for privatization, this may assist them in structur-
ing deals in Russia. Option One may guarantee the foreign in-
vestor voting control. Option Two may be preferable to
companies interested in joint venture agreements. Option Three
offers limited opportunities for foreign investors until the expi-
ration of the one year contract. If the 1993 Privatization Pro-
gram retains the same options, foreign investors might be able to
influence the selection of privatization options through negotia-
tions with management and employees. 6°
H. SECURITIES MARKET
In order to encourage the development of a securities mar-
ket, the RLP provides for the creation and regulation of licensed
investment funds and holding companies. 61 Decree 1186 pro-
vides the legal basis for the registration of these funds, which
already exceed 300 according to some estimates.62 This licensing
mechanism is intended to guarantee the professional and compe-
59. It seems so far that this is the option preferred by employees. This,
however, raises the question of how effective such a method of privatization
may be when employees, afraid of lay-offs and drastic management changes,
effectively retain the right to block unpopular measures. In the absence of ef-
fective bankruptcy legislation, this simply means perpetuating the old system.
60. The 1992 Privatization Program set the deadline for the adoption of
privatization plans by individual enterprises at October 1, 1992.
61. RLP, supra note 12, article 8, provides that such funds cannot hold
more than 10% of the voting shares of, or invest more than 5% of their funds, in
a single joint-stock company. A similar restriction was implemented in Czecho-
slovakia in order to avoid the possibility of a single fund controlling a large
number of companies. See Privatization: Bold Promise by Privatization Funds
Multiplies Interest in C.S.F.R Voucher Plan, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 320
(Feb. 19, 1992).
62. Decree No. 1186, of October 7, 1992, "On Measures for the Organization
of a Securities Market in the Process of Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, Oct. 16, 1992, at 3, and Annex No. 1, "On
Investment Funds," Annex No. 2, "On Specialized Investment Funds of Priva-
tization, Accumulating Privatization Checks of Citizens, Annex No. 3, "Model
Statute of an Investment Fund," Annex No. 4, "Basic Provisions of a Deposit
Contract," Annex No. 5, "Model Contract with Manager on Investment Fund
Management," and Annex No. 6, "Model Prospect for Investment Fund Emis-
sions." Id.
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tent management of the privatization checks.63
Specialized Investment Funds are those entitled to accumu-
late vouchers from the population for their subsequent use in
the privatization process.64 In contrast, holding companies are
created during the process of conversion from state enterprises
into joint-stock companies.6 Holding companies are empowered
to manage the controlling packet of shares of their daughter
companies, including the "Golden Share,"'' and are allowed to
engage in investment activities.67 It should be noted that hold-
ing companies are created only following approval from the
State Anti-monopoly Committee, and cannot own the control-
ling packet of shares of enterprises whose market share for a
product exceeds thirty-five percent of the market.6s
The basic idea behind sponsoring the establishment of a vast
network of investment funds is two-fold: first, to help inexperi-
enced citizens use their privatization checks and prevent them
from being defrauded by dishonest entrepreneurial individuals;
and second, to create the opportunity for citizens even in the
most remote areas to participate in the privatization of any en-
terprise in the territory of the Russian Federation.
I. FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The 1992 Program contains a number of provisions with re-
gard to foreign investment which complement the Russian Fed-
eration Law on Foreign Investment. In general, restrictions on
foreign investors in Russia have been substantially eased, and
foreign investors are actively encouraged to participate in the
privatization of state and municipal enterprises.6 9 The 1992 Pro-
gram, however, limits foreign participation to open auctions,
closed auctions, or tenders and investment auctions. Two areas
require additional permission. First, foreign acquisition of small
63. Regulation No. 695-r of November 4, 1992, "On Confirming the Statute
on Licensing the Activity of Specialized Investment Funds Accumulating Priva-
tization Checks from Citizens, of their Managers, and on the Procedure on Sus-
pending and Revoking of Licenses," KOMMERSANT, Nov. 9-15, 1992, at 15.
64. Decree No. 1186, supra note 62, annex no. 2, art. 1(1).
65. Temporary Statute on Holding Companies Created During the Reor-
ganization of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock Companies, ROSSISKIE VESTI
No. 98, Nov. 1992, at 1.
66. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
67. Decree No. 1186, supra note 62, art. 1(4).
68. Id. art. 2(3).
69. Article 37, Law on Foreign Investment in the RSFSR, of July 4, 1991,31
I.L.M. 397 (1992). For a brief discussion of the law see the introductory note by
W. G. Frenkel.
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enterprises (those with less than 200 employees and assets of
less than one million rubles) is subject to approval from the local
Soviet. Second, for certain sectors of industry, such as energy,
precious metals and radioactive materials, the Government must
further specify whether foreign investment will be allowed.
Other limitations not specifically mentioned in the program,
are excluded. It appears that the statutory limitations on for-
eign investment should be narrowly construed.70
The Program for Deepening the Economic Reform also en-
courages foreign investment by allowing ninety-nine year leases
on land,71 the conclusion of bilateral investment guarantee
agreements, granting tax deductions and tax holidays for joint
ventures, and encouraging the development of a network of free
economic zones.72 The provision on lease of land has been fur-
ther liberalized with the adoption of a new decree on the sale of
land (DSL),73 which takes a big step toward allowing the owner-
ship of land by foreigners. The provisions of the DSL can be
summarized as follows:
0 investors will be allowed to purchase commercial land either
as part of a privatized enterprise or as additional acreage needed
for expansion;
* the DSL applies to all types of land except areas restricted for
general public use, streets, rivers, agricultural land, sites con-
taminated with hazardous waste, and lands regulated by the
Law on Underground Resources;
* the land sale is a transaction separate from the privatization of
70. The BLP does not restrict foreign investors, but the general provisions
of the Bulgarian Law on Foreign Investment, requiring licensing for foreign
investment in certain sectors of the economy, still apply. In Poland, foreigners
may not acquire more than 10% of the shares owned by the State Treasury
without permission from the Foreign Investment Agency. PLP, supra note 14,
art. 19(2). Foreigners, however, may freely acquire shares on the secondary
market. In Czechoslovakia, a certain number of shares may be reserved for
Czechoslovak citizens. CSLP, supra note 14, art. 6. In response to public pres-
sure, the Hungarian government has drafted a bill that would give priority to
Hungarian investors over foreigners in the privatization of state-owned compa-
nies. Hungarian Proposal Would Favor Domestic over Foreign Investors, 9
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 988 (June 3, 1992).
71. In Bulgaria foreigners may acquire land if they are incorporated in Bul-
garia. BLP, supra note 14, art. 5(2).
72. Program, supra note 1, point 5. Russia's purpose in establishing free
economic zones is distinct from the goal of the Chinese model of free economic
zones. Unlike the situation in China, free economic zones in Russia are estab-
lished for attracting foreign capital, not domestic capital. See Effects of Free
Economic Zones Analyzed, F.B.I.S., Apr. 5, 1993, at 36, for a discussion of Rus-
sia's free economic zones.
73. Decree No. 631, supra note 13.
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an enterprise, although this will not pose a problem as long as
the land does not fall into a category restricted for sale;
* the buyer of the land may be any legal entity or individual,
domestic or foreign, as long as the conditions of RLP article 9
are satisfied;
* the price of the land is to be determined according to the
newly enacted law on payment for land;
• land sales can be conditioned on meeting certain special-use
requirements.
It is important to note that all payments for privatized en-
terprises must be made in rubles, and that foreign investors are
allowed to use their accumulated ruble earnings. 74 Although
RLFI article 37 appears to control currency exchange rates for
foreign trade, this provision is clearly outdated, having been su-
perseded by the decision of the Central Bank of Russia to intro-
duce a single foreign exchange rate as of July 1, 1992.75
In order to facilitate foreign investment, an international
foundation for promoting privatization and foreign investment
has been established in Russia to provide information, expertise,
and legal assistance to foreigners.76 In addition, as of June 4,
1992, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) pro-
vides direct loans, loan guarantees, and political risk insurance
for U.S. investments in Russia.77 Furthermore, on June 17, 1992,
Former U.S. President George Bush and President Yeltsin
signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty Concerning the Encour-
agement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, which has
since been submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification.78 Once
74. Lithuania has recently taken a different approach by adopting a special
statute on auctions for convertible currency. Statute on Privatization of State
Property for Freely Convertible Currency, DELOVOI MIR, Aug. 12, 1992, at 14.
75. This rate is fixed by the Central Bank, twice a week, according to the
results obtained at the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange and it currently
fluctuates around 570 R for a dollar. Weekly Survey of Currency Exchange
Markets, F.B.I.S., Mar. 3, 1993, at 35. The legal framework for the foreign cur-
rency operations was established by the adoption of the Law on Currency Regu-
lation and Control, KommERsANT, Oct. 13-19, 1992, at 5. Unfortunately,
however, the terms of the law are very broad and it can not become fully opera-
tive without the adoption of a considerable number of Central Bank decrees or
regulations.
76. Privatization Opened to Foreign Investment, F.B.I.S., July 10, 1992, at
47.
77. According to a spokesman for OPIC, so far some 300 U.S. companies
have registered applications for insurance. Export Financing: OPIC Programs
Now Available for U.S. Investors in Russia, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1006
(June 10, 1992).
78. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, June 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 794.
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ratified, the treaty will provide certain guarantees to investors in
both countries and will protect American businessmen against
investment risks in Russia.79
IV. MOSCOW PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
Shortly after the adoption of the Russian 1992 Privatization
Program, the mayor of Moscow signed a legislative package in-
tended to bring privatization in Moscow into conformity with
the Federation program.80 The following analysis focuses on the
main points and differences of this package with the federation
program.
The Moscow Privatization Program does not contain an en-
terprise buy-out provision. The mayor's resolution repeals a No-
vember 1991 resolution on privatization, which provided for a
buy-out of certain categories of enterprises by their employees.
The repealed resolution is similar to Option Two of the Russian
1992 Privatization Program, which provides that employees may
acquire up to fifty-one percent of the shares.8'
One part of this legislative package, the Statute on Close
Subscription to Shares, applies whenever shares are distributed
among employees and management under either Option One,
Two or Three of the Russian 1992 Privatization Program. The
Statute regulates the distribution of shares when the demand
for discount shares exceeds the availability of such shares, and
determines details such as the amount of the minimum initial
payment and the use of privatization checks.
The 1992 Moscow Privatization Program was adopted upon
proposal from the Moscow Committee on Property, and puts an
end to the disagreement between the Mayor's office and the
Committee. Basically, the disagreement centered around the
authority to sell state property. It was resolved by the provision
79. The Treaty guarantees the right to repatriate profits (article IV), pro-
vides for non-discriminatory treatment of U.S. investors (article II), allows
third-party international arbitration (article VI), and guarantees prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation in convertible currency in the event of expro-
priation (article III). Text published in RUSSIA AND COMMoNWEALTH Bus. LAw
REP., Aug. 10, 1992, at 9.
80. Resolution No. 250-PM of August 5, 1992 on Bringing the Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises in Moscow in Conformity with the State
Privatization Program, Statute on the City and District Commissions on Priva-
tization in Moscow, Statute on Close Subscription to Shares at the Privatization
of State and Municipal Enterprises, Program on Privatization of State and Mu-
nicipal Enterprises in Moscow in 1992, July 31, 1992, KoMMERSANT, Aug. 3-10,
1992, at 21-22 [hereinafter Moscow Program].
81. See supra Part III.G. for a discussion of Option Two.
[Vol. 2:207
RUSSLAN PRIVATIZATION
that enterprises will be sold by the Property Fund, which con-
forms with article 6 of the Federal Program. The Program gen-
erally follows the 1992 Russian Federation Program, but there
are four exceptions.
First, in order to increase the financial capability of poten-
tial investors, the Moscow Program provides for the implemen-
tation of "banking pledges," which will allow the owner of
immovable property to acquire credit from a financial institution
by mortgaging the property.8 2 Given the uncertainties in the
Russian economy, however, mortgaging property may be judged
an unacceptable risk by many investors.
Second, there are substantial differences in the provisions
for appraisal. According to the Moscow Program, point 5(1)(2),
the historical cost is increased by a number of coefficients that
are not specifically defined in the program, but are likely to sub-
stantially increase the initial auction price. One may speculate
that they will be connected with city zoning, but so far no addi-
tional instructions have been issued as to how such coefficients
will be applied. In addition, point 5(1)(5) of the Moscow pro-
gram provides that some very valuable enterprises may be ap-
praised directly in foreign currency, which would be converted
to rubles at the date of sale. Obviously, this is one possible re-
sponse to the problem of inflation.
The third difference applies to buyouts of leased property,
which are limited in the Moscow Program to commerce, services
and restaurants.83 The Federation Program does not contain
such limitations.84
The fourth major difference applies to foreign investment.
The Moscow Program, in a provision similar to that of the Fed-
eration Program with regard to small businesses, 5 specifies that
foreign investment in commerce, services and restaurants is sub-
ject to approval from the Moscow Property Committee. Such
permission, however, is not required for downtown Moscow
enterprises.8 6
82. Moscow Program, supra note 80, point 4.
83. Id. supra note 80, point 10.5. This category is comprised of contracts
concluded according to the provisions of the Law on Enterprises and En-
trepreneurial activity, which provides that employees may form a company that
leases and buys out the existing enterprise.
84. For a discussion of the buyout of leased property under the Federation
Program, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
85. See supra Part III.I. for a discussion of the Federation Program's provi-
sion on small businesses.
86. Moscow Program, supra note 80, point 10.5.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although surrounded by a great deal of controversy and op-
position within the country, the Russian privatization program is
under way and is producing results. The success of the reform
as a whole will depend on its implementation during the next
few years, after privatization vouchers are distributed and tested
in market conditions. For the time being there is substantial un-
certainty about the real value of a voucher and whether its face
value is indeed backed by real state funds or is just speculative.
In order to maintain the public's faith in the voucher and to in-
crease its appeal, the Russian government has initiated plans to
"extend the zone of action" of the vouchers by including apart-
ments, houses and land plots in the privatization process. This
decision corresponds to the priority needs of the majority of
Russian citizens, who are mainly concerned with satisfying basic
needs rather than becoming Western style entrepreneurs. In
the meantime, it is clear that only after the establishment of a
real securities market and after Mutual Funds begin operating
on a large scale will an adequate supply and demand mechanism
be created.
In general, the West has been slow to invest in the Russian
economy. According to Russian estimates, so far only about $1
billion has been invested,8 7 and only $13 billion has been dis-
bursed from the $24 billion promised by the G-7.88 Among the
major concerns for foreign investors, political instability,
problems with foreign debt servicing, bureaucracy, corruption,
and legal uncertainty are the most obvious. In addition, inves-
tors must be concerned with the monetary policy of the Central
Bank of Russia, currency regulation, labor and environmental
law regulations, and enterprise indebtedness.
Although the process of privatization in Russia may well
seem chaotic, risky, and unpredictable, even the most skeptical
observer can not deny the unprecedented scope of the reforms
and the far reaching legal changes introduced by President Yelt-
sin and his advisers. The leaders of the reform are working
under constant political pressure, and the tasks to be accom-
plished in order to make this process irreversible are numerous.
It is important, therefore, to note that the stakes for the future
of Russia are enormous. In order to give reformers a chance,
increased and intelligent cooperation from the West will be
needed.
87. Problems Slow Western Investments, F.B.I.S., Jan. 15, 1993, at 48.
88. Aid to Russia, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1993, at A18.
[Vol. 2:207
